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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT
of the

I

STATE OF UTAH
ZlO~~
t\. A.,

Fl H~T XATTOXAL BANK,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
~~~~~CI~:H

C. TAYLOR, BANK
(
t'O:\IJII~~IOX.BJR OF THE STATE )
<H, UTAH and FIRST SECURITY
STAT~~ BANK,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case

No.
9960

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully moves the court,
pursuant to Rule 7G(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedun', to reconsider its opinion in this case, grant
a rehearing, and upon said reconsideration and rehearing
to modify its prior decision, eliminating the direction
by the l ~ourt to ren1and the branch bank application of
appellant, First Security State Bank, to the Bank
Commissioner for further proceedings.
The decision should be reconsidered and a rehearing
granted for the following reasons:

I. There is a legally sufficient record before this
Court upon which to base an absolute affirmance of the
Trial Court's ruling without remand for further proceedings.
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A. The deposition of Spencer C. Taylor, Bank
Connnissioner, constitutes a proper part of the
record in that it was stipulated into evidence
as constituting the basis upon which his disputed decision was rendered.

B. The deposition of Spencer C. Taylor, Bank
Connnissioner, constitutes a proper part of the
record in that it established the factual basis
upon which his disputed decision was rendered,
as distinguished from inquiry into his mental
processes.
II. Under the affirmative facts in the record before
this Court, there was "unreasonable interference" by
reason of "such close proximity" in violation of the
-branch bank statute applicable to unincorporated areas
of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
J. Thomas Greene
Paul B. 'Cannon
Attorneys for Respondent
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BlUE~, 0~,

PLAIXTIFF-RESPOXDEKT IN
Sl' PI'Oi:T OF pgrriTIOX FOR REHEARING
PHI~~Ll~LLX..:U{.Y

STATEl\lENT

Thi~ wa~

an adiun brought by Zions First National
I~ank (•hallenging as unauthorized in law and without
foundation in fact the order of Spencer C. Taylor, Bank
Couuuissioner of the State of Utah, which granted First
St•(·urity State Bank (hereinafter referred to as First
~~·l·urity) a charter to establish a branch bank in the
Cottonwood ~Lall in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Trial
l'ourt found that the Bank Commissioner abused his
administrative discretion in that he failed to take account
of or ignored the branch banking statute applicable to
unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County (7-3-6 U.C.A.
l~l~);), as runended). Respondent sought affirmance of
the Trial Court'~ ruling on the ground of abuse of
ad.tnin1~trative discretion (both in ignoring the "close
proximity" statute by failing to make factual determinations contemplated thereby, and in rendering an alleged
d!'termination that the new branch would "subserve the
public convenience and advantage"), but also upon the
broader ground that under affirmatively shown facts
in the record, there was "unreasonable interference" as
a matter of law occasioned by ··such close proximity"
within the Ineaning of 7-3-6 U.C ..A., 1953, as amended.
The decision of this Court, filed April 7, 1964, affirmed
the lower Court's judgut~nt setting aside the order
granting the branch bank charter, but ren1anded the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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application to the Bank Commissioner for further proceedings. It appears that the principal reason for remand was that a portion of the record, namely the
deposition of the Bank Commissioner, was regarded as
not reviewable or properly before the Court, although
the said deposition ~was taken by plaintiff without objection, offered into evidence by the defendants, and stipulated as a part of the record by all parties. The legal
sufficiency of the said deposition as a reviewable part
of the record has never been argued by counsel for
either side.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS A LEGALLY SUFFI CIENT RECORD BEFORE
THIS COURT UPON WHICH TO BASE AN ABSOLUTE
AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WITHOUT REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
1

The basis for the Court's order of remand essentially
appears to be that a legally reviewable record was not
before the Court, and that a public hearing should be
held to create a proper record. In this connection, the
Court stated that the deposition of Spencer C. Taylor,
Bank Commissioner, "should never have been taken."
Petitioner requests to be heard as to these matters.
Counsel has had no opportunity at any stage of these
proceedings to present authorities or to submit argument
with reference to these points. Accordingly, this petition
is filed primarily for the purpose of presenting authorities and argument which would justify this Court in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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n·viPwiru. ~ thP untin· r<·<·ord before it, including the Bank
Commissioul'r's dt'}Jo . . ·itiou, and rendering a decision
without m·<·P~~arily rmnanding this cause for further
pro<'l'udings.
A. THE DEPOSITION OF SPENCER C. TAYLOR CONSTITUTES A PROPER PART OF THE RECORD IN THA:T
IT WAS STIPULATED INTO EVIDENCE AS ·CONSTITUTING THE BASIS UPON WHICH HIS DI,SPUTED DECISION
WAS RENDERED.

The depo~ition of ~pencer U. Taylor, Bank Commissioner, wm.; takPn lcitlwut objection by either counsel
for the defendant Bank Commissioner or counsel for
thP defendant First Security. At the trial, it was offered
into P\·idPtH'<' by the defendants, and it was stipulated
into evidence by all parties after deletion of certain
portions which related to information obtained by the
Conunissioner after the date of his decision and therefore
couldn't have been considered by him as a basis for the
disputed decision.
It would appear that any claim of privilege which
might otherwise haYe been asserted relative either to
the initial deposition or its introduction into evidence
was conclusively waived by reason of failure to object
tlwr~to. 16 An1. Jur .. Depositions, § 138. In any event,
the factual content of the deposition, pertaining to what
wa~ before the Com1nissioner, became a matter of stipulation. The stipulation agreed upon provided in part :

..... it is stipulated by and between the parties
herein that the deposition of Spencer C.Taylor,
bank
of provided
the byState
Utah,
taken
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law conunissioner
Library. Funding for digitization
the Instituteof
of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
before Lois P. Crowder, notary public, on April
22, 1963, offered by defendants, may he admitted
in evidence as the testimony of said Spencer C.
Taylor in support of the issuance of the certificate
dated October 16, 1962, for the establishment of
a branch bank by First Security State Bank in
Salt Lake County, Utah, subject, however, to the
following conditions: .... "
(R. 107) (Emphasis added)
The general law applicable to stipulations is that:
". . . stipulations made by parties to a judicial
proceeding, or by their attorneys, within the scope
of their authority, are binding upon those who
make them and those whom they lawfully represent, and also upon the trial and appellate courts,
in the absence of any valid ground or reason for
refusing enforcement." (Emphasis added.)
50 Am. Jur., Stipulations,§ 9
The authors of American J urispudence have noted
that stipulations may supplement otherwise deficient
records for purposes of judicial review in administrative
proceedings :
"While it is better practice for an appealing party
to file in court a verbatim record of testimony
taken before the agency, where the statute providing for the appeal does not require such record
it was held there was no error in permitting the
filing of a transcript certified to by the commission as constitttting the substance of the testimony
heard by it 'to the best of our recollection.' ... by
the grace of court, and in the absence of objection,
an appeal my be heard on an irregular record."
(Emphasis added.)
2 Am. J ur., Administrative Law, § 722 at p. 623
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'rhis Court has recognized the principle that stipulntions ol' l'ad an· not only binding upon the parties, but
upon tlw eourts. 'fhus, in RickcJ/lJcrg v. Capitol Garage,
liS Ftah :m, ~-t~) l'a<'. 1:21 (1926), a ~tipulation was upheld
t'Vt'll though t•vidPJWP was presented which the court
nott•d supportt·d a eontrary contention. The court said:
.. \Y" rPmark, a cmnplete answer to the foregoing
<·onh•ntion is that it was stipulated at the hearing
in tlw eourt below, and the stipulation appears
in t hP record, that the respondent was convicted
of tlw offense of driving an automobile while
intoxi('atP<l. Respondent is bound by that stipulat ioJ/. w1d so are we." (Emphasis added.)
~-+9 P. 2d at 122
~~l'l'
l~tah

also l'ulkcr-Sculccruft Lurnber Co. v. Vance, 36
3-!S, 103 Pac. 970 (1909').)

In Denver (0 R.G.H'.R. Co. v. Central Weber Sewer
I. Di~t.,-! Utah 2d 105,287 P.2d 884 (1955), this Court
judicially n•viewed an administrative decision wherein
the record was otherwise deficient, since the record
was bolstered by additional stipulated facts. In that
casp Justice Henriod said:
"Ordinarily on writ of review the certified record
alone is exruninable. Not so, however, where the
record and determination of the cornrnission or
board are unsupported by sorne kind of reasonably substantial proof. In that event the judiciary
may awaken to question their warrant, and in
doing so, may receive, examine and weigh evidence, if neces~ary, as it did here on stipulated
facts,
to the
end
that provided
due process
guarantees
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maintain." (Emphasis added.)
287 P.2d at 886, 887
In this case the parties desired to stipulate and did
stipulate in effect that what the Bank Commissioner,
Spencer C. Taylor, testified to in his deposition was in
fact the evidence which was before him and constituted
the evidence upon which he based his administrative
decision. By virtue of this stipulation of fact the record
became established and properly reviewable quite independent of the question whether or not the deposition
should have been taken in the first place. Since the Bank
Commissioner has stipulated as to the facts upon which
he based his Certificate for a branch bank issued October
16, 1962, and the question before this Court is whether
or not that Certificate was valid when issued, a hearing
before the Bank Commissioner now conducted for the
purpose of determining the validity of the Certificate
already issued cannot properly develop any facts other
than or in addition to those already stipulated to by the
Bank Commissioner. The record is properly reviewable
as to matters previously argued before this Court, then,
since it constitutes a stipulated record.
B. THE DEPOSITION OF SPENCER C. TAYLOR, BANK
COMMISSIONER, CONSTITUTES A PROPER PART OF THE
RECORD IN THAT' IT ESTABLISHED THE FACTUAL
BA:SIS UPON WHICH HIS DISPUTED DECISION WAS
RENDERED, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM INQUIRY INTO
'HIS M,ENTAL PROCESSES.

The Court's decision apparently regards the deposition which was taken of the Bank Commissioner as an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unwunruitctl at tt•tupt to probe the 1nental processes of an
admi11i:-;lratin· offirPr in his quasi-judicial capacity. In
thi~ n·guru, tlw l'ourt said that the deposition " ... in
el'l't•d, attL•HtptL·d to elicit his reasons." The authority
l'ill'd ru1d tluoted by the Court as applicable and controlling is the fourth of the so-called protracted ".Morgan
ca~l':-;, ...11 orgu II v. l .II it eel States, 313 u.s. 409 (1941) .
.\:-; aln•ady noted, there has been no opportunity heretofore for COl/lise! to ()OIIuneut or submit argument with
n·spcct to the relevance of the said ill organ case, which
authority wa~ set forth for the first time in these proceedings in this Court's opinion. It is submitted that
both the fact::; and the principle set forth in the Morgan
case are fundamentally distinguishable from the case
at bar!
In Morgan there was a mandatory statutory requireHit' Ill for a "full hcarillg" before the Secretary of AgricuUurc. ~uch a hearing "·as held and a voluminous record
ll'as made. Tlw deposition of the Secretary was authorized over the Got·ernment's objection, and it was apparent that thl• purpose of the deposition was not to elicit
factual data otherwise unavailable, but fundamentally
the purpose was to probe the relative weight given by the
administrator to rarious portions of the existing record.
l- ndt.•r this stah, of facts the U.S. Supre1ne Court regarded the exrunination essentially as an inquiry or probe
into the Secretary's mental processes.
On tlw other hand. in the ca~e at bar, Justice Callister correctly observed that there was 110 statutory right
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to a hearing before the State Bank Commi00iouer, and
commented that "the legislature saw fit in 1957 to eliminate the mandatory requirement that public hearings
be held." Since the old statute, U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, had
been repealed and there was no law on the books relative
to public hearings at pertinent times herein, the Bank
Commissioner held no hearing and no record was made.
Accordingly, the deposition of the Bank Commissioner
was taken without objection as the only practicable means
of determining the facts, if any, which were before him
as the b,asis for the decision which had already been
rendered. The deposition wasn't meant to "elicit reasons"
or "probe mental processes." Rather, it was designed
to and did simply determine the facts which were before
the Commissioner.

A fundamental distinction exists between taking
depositions of administrative officers to "probe mental
processes" as compared with necessary inquiry into the
factual basis for the decision in question. The :Morgan
cases are consistent with such a distinction. Actually,
while the fourth Morgan case referred to in the Court's
decision herein has been regarded as 1nodifying somewhat
the previous Morgan cases as to the propriety of taking
depositions of administrative officers, the ~Iorgan cases
are not necessarily inconsistent with themselves and the
Court did not expressly retreat or recede from its former
statements. In the first ~forgan case the Court required
defendants (including the Secretary of Agriculture) to
answer allegations that a rate order was 1nade "without
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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having heard or n·ad any of tlH· evidence, and without
hnving heard tht· oral argmnenb or having read or
eonsi<lt>rPd the briPf~ whieh the plaintiff sub1nitted."
.l/or!Jlllt r. United 8/u/('s, :.ms U.~. -!-(iS, -1-78 (1936).
~imilarly. whilP in thP second ~l_organ case tlu· Secretary':-; order wa:-; upsPt because of procedural defects,
thP Court n·t·ognized tlH· necessity of administrative
offit·t·r~· dPei:-;ions bt·ing l>a:-;Pd upon considerations of
evidPIH't'. The Court said:
"ln thP light of this testi1nony th('re is nu occasion
to discuss the e.rteut to which tlze Secretary examined the cl;idellc<', and we agree with the Governlllt'llt ':-; contention that it was not the function
of the eourt to probe the mental process of the
~l'l'rt>tary in reaehing his conclusions if he gave
the hearing which the law required." (E1nphasis
added.)
1llorgan r. r:nitcd States} 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938~
ln any l'VPnt, the authors of Alnerican Jurisprudence
han• nott•d a line of cases distinguishable from the
~lorgan ea~P under which circu1nstances similar to the
l:<l~l' at bar justify the taking of depositions of admini~trative officials:
··The decision in the first Morgan Case that
the officer who decides in administrative proceedings n1ust consider the evidence taken before
another official raised the problen1 whether on
review the party seeking relief from an administrative order might examine the officer or subject
him to interrogatories regarding the process by
which he reached his conclusions. However, the
rater :Morgan Cases settled that just as a judge
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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integrity of the adrninistrative process must be
equally respected. Earlier cases stated the same
principle. It has been held in some state courts
that where an order is only prima facie correct
and is required to be made upon evidence and
no record of the evidence is required to be kept, the
officers making the order may be called as
witnesses and required to testify whether in fact
any evidence was submitted to and considered by
them as the basis for such order." (Emphasis
added.)
42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 2-!2.
An A.L.R. annotation also discusses the most recent
Morgan decision together with cases which take the
contrary position. 18 A.L.R. 2d 606 (1951).
In State v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 72 Fla.
379, 73 So. 171 (1916), the court was confronted by the
contention that Railroad Commissioners had made an
order relating to carriage of freight without any evidence
before them upon which to base such an order. The court
ruled that the commissioners could be called as witnesses
and required to testify whether, in fact, any evidence
was submitted to and considered by them. The court said:
"We have considered the testimony of the
railroad comn1issioners, :Mr. Burr, :.Mr. Blitch,
and Mr. Dunn, in this case, and overrule the
point made by their attorney that it is contrary
to public policy 'that a railroad commissioner
should be called as a witness to impeach their
own orders.' This court has said that, although
the law gives to administrative action the effect
of prima facie reasonableness, the courts may
inquire into the reasonableness of the action .. ·"
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'fhe partiP~ have had their day in court, have
ht>Pn ]ward upon the law and evidence before
tht> tribunal possessing the power and authority
to dett•rnline the questions, but the very authority
of the railroad conwti.ssioners in making such an
order ({:) the one involved in this case depends
llJJOII th<' fact that evi.dence was before them upon
ll'hich to base the order·. To say that a carrier
UfJU i 11st u:lwm such an order is made cannot call
a railroad commi00ianer· as a witness to show that
h(' had no crideuce before him on which to base
the order, or the character of evidence which was
before hi111, zcmtld be in effect to hold the order
itself cauclusive of its reasonableness and accomplish i 11d irectly, by a technical rule of evidence
made for the occasion, that which admittedly
cwwot be directly accomplished by legislative
cuactmeut. It would render meaningless the language of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commissioners,~33 U.S. 601, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 59 L. Ed. 379;
Intt•rstate Connnerce Commission v. Union Pac.
Hy. Co., 222 U.S. 5-±1, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed.
308. llou; cottld it be shown that no ev~dence
H'a.s before the cmnmis0ioners, and none considered by them in makillg the order, unless by the
rcry person before whom it was pretended to be
submitted? The law does not require them to
preserve th et·ideuce in writing and file it, nor
recite it in their orders~ therefore the absence
of any such record fron1 the files of their office
raises no presrunption that no evidence was
heard.'' (Emphasis added.)
73 So. at 176

In State ex rel. Jladison .Airport Co. v. Wrabetz,
et al. 231 \\~ise. 1-17, 283 X.\Y. 504: (1939), a writ of mandamus was sought relative to commanding the State
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Industrial Commission to correct an award so as to
conform to true facts. The court ruled that petitioner
would be entitled to introduce proof that members
of the Industrial Commission did not in fact base their
review on necessary evidence and said :
"Although it is not within the court's functions
or province to probe the mental processes of administrative officials in reaching conclusions,
the recitals of their orders as to their procedure
in conducting quasi-judicial proceedings are not
co~lusive in actions to !determine whether a
plaintiff is entitled to have an order vacated on
the ground that the officials acted without or in
excess of their powers, and in such actions the
plaintiff is entitled to have the court receive
his proof and render a decision on that issue."
285 N.W. at 508. (Emphasis added.)
In National Labor Relations Bd. v. Cherry Cotton
Mills, 98 F.2d -l±-1, (CA 5, 1938), reh. den. 98 F.2d 1021,
it was held that interrogatories for discovery might be
addressed to members of the National Labor Relations
Board where it was claimed that there had not been a
fair hearing and that there was failure to give proper
consideration to evidence submitted. Such was permitted
in order to preserve judicial review of pretended
findings.
In a very recent case arising in the district of rtah,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the right
of inquiry into the facts before the Securities & Exchange
Commission with reference to the issue of abuse of
administrative discretion. In that case, the appellate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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t•uurt sd a~idc a judgment enforcing an adutinistrative
::;ubpoPna in view of an uncontron·rtt·d affidavit that
tlH· Conuni~~ion was proceeding in an arbitrary and
unfnir munm·r. Shasta J/ i ue ral .,· & Chemical Campa ny
r. St'Cit rit in; cl'· E.rchWI!JC Conunission, 328 F.2d 285
(l'.\ 10 1964).

In vonl'lusion as to the right of factual inquiry, this
~·ourt hy its prt>~l'nt opinion, consistent with Inany prior
pn•et•dPnts, rt:>eognizes a clear right to judicial review
of I ht' act ion of ad m iu i.strative ageucies on the question
of alnt.-..·c of ad m i 11 istrative discretiou. In this connection,
Ju~tiet> Calli~tPr notPd that the Bank Commissioner's
dPei~ion could stand only ''if it is supported by any
substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious."
Thus, wt> are confronted with the problein of having
hPfore us a decision which was clearly reviewable if, but
ouly if. therC' wn~ 011 appropriate factual foundation upon
u:hich to lwsc such judicial rcz·iczc. It is submitted that
under tlw circumstances of this case it ·was appropriate
t(\ take the Bank Commissioner's deposition in order to
t ~~~tblish facts sufficient for consideration upon review.
POINT II
l"XDER THE AFFIR:\IATIVE FACTS IN THE RECORD
BEFORE THIS COl'RT, THERE WAS "UNREASONABLE
IXTERFERENCE" BY REASON OF "SUCH CLOSE PROXDIITY" IN VIOLATION OF THE BRANCH BANK STATUTE
APPLICABLE TO UNINCORPORATED AREAS OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, UTAH.

This point is urged a~ an independent ground in
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to this matter, it is not urged that the Court uwdify or
change its decision in any particular, but only that it
be expanded so as to elucidate principles recognized by
the Court in its opinion in view of facts before the Court
in the record. It is acknowledged that the Court has
ruled in effect that the matter of whether or not "close
proximity" constitutes "unreasonable interference" is
a question of fact and not of law. Thus, this Court stated
that " 'close proximity' does not in and of itself prohibit
the establishment of a branch. The 'close proximity'
must 'unreasonably interfere' with the established bank
or branch." However, it affirmatively appears from
facts within the record before this Court that there was
u such close proximity" as to constitute "unreasonable
interference."
The record affirmatively discloses by admission in
the pleadings that Zions "is losing money as a result
of the operation of its branch in the Cottonwood Mall
and that the addition of another branch in the area would
have an adverse financial effect upon the business of
the Cottonwood Branch of the plaintiff." (R. 5, 10) In
this connection, evidence was presented to Commissioner
'Taylor that at least three years after the time the
shopping center opened (which would be sometime in
1965 or 1966) would be required to enable the Zions
branch to "become self-sustaining" (R. 26) and to get
"on its feet" (Dep. 34), in view of the nature and
location of the branch. The factual survey hy the Bank
Commissioner's office disclosed an unusual degree of
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hank per (~api ta ::;aturation in the area resulting in an
"on·r bankt~d condition,'' and "no need" for additional
banking facilities in the area in <.J.Uestion (R. 87). In
addition, it appears frmn the deposition of Commissioner
Taylor that the Zions Branch being located within the
~I all had foregone the advantages of the free-standing
drive-in tn)(' bank business (Dep. 33), and that its suce.P~~ depended upon attraction of the business accounts
primarily within the Mall itself (R. 26). However,
tlvidl'tH'(' before the Cmnmissioner also disclosed that
First ~t·eurity emphasized as a condition to success
at its contemplated location within the Mall the taking
over of the very accounts necessary to sustain the new
Zions Branch, namely, acquisition of "business accounts
primarily from the shopping center itself .... " (R. 20)
(Emphasis added.)
X one of the foregoing facts are disputed anywhere
in the record, and based upon such this Court could and
should interpret the unique branch banking statute
which is applicable only to unincorporated areas of
~a.lt Lake County so as to give substance to it and to
declare whether or not in the light of these facts there
was a violation of the statute. It is submitted that these
facts affirmatively show "such close proximity" as to
constitute "unreasonable interference."

CONCLUSION
Tlw fundrunental basis for this petition i8 that the
parties
ought to be giren a11 opport'unity to present
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argument with respect to the action which has beeJ
taken in remanding the case to the Bank Commissione:
for further proceedings. Rmnand to the Bank Commis
sioner for further proceedings was not requested b~
either party, was not argued, and counsel for 11eithe1
side has been heard as to this matter. Rehearing i~
particularly requested so that the views of counsel may
be presented and considered by the Court.
It is submitted that a proper record already exists
before the Court and that the deposition of the Bank
Commissioner constitutes a valid portion of such record
both by virtue of the stipulation of the parties and by
reason of the nature and purpose of the deposition
itself as a necessary determination of facts. In any
event, since the determinative question before the Trial
Court and this Court is the validity of the Certificate
for a branch bank issued October 16, 1962, and the
defendants have stipulated as to all of the facts constituting the basis for the Certificate, a rehearing before
the Commissioner on the present application cannot
legitimately establish any other or different record than
~s now before this Court.
It is also submitted that the record presents sufficient undisputed facts as to show affirmatively a
violation of the branch bank statute applicable to unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County, i.e., "unreasonable
interference" occasioned by "such close proximity."
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plaintiff-respondent rerehearing be held in this rnatter.
RP~IH·etfully

submitted,
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& CANNON
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